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Abstract. Coin flipping is a cryptographic primitive for which strictly
better protocols exist if the players are not only allowed to exchange
classical, but also quantum messages. During the past few years, several
results have appeared which give a tight bound on the range of imple-
mentable unconditionally secure coin flips, both in the classical as well as
in the quantum setting and for both weak as well as strong coin flipping.
But the picture is still incomplete: in the quantum setting, all results
consider only protocols with perfect correctness, and in the classical set-
ting tight bounds for strong coin flipping are still missing.
We give a general definition of coin flipping which unifies the notion of
strong and weak coin flipping (it contains both of them as special cases)
and allows the honest players to abort with a certain probability. We give
tight bounds on the achievable range of parameters both in the classical
and in the quantum setting.
1 Introduction
Coin flipping (or coin tossing) as a cryptographic primitive has been introduced
by Blum [5] and is one of the basic building blocks of secure two-party compu-
tation [21].
Coin flipping can be defined in several ways. The most common definition,
sometimes called strong coin flipping, allows two honest players to receive a
uniform random bit c ∈ {0, 1}, such that a dishonest player cannot increase the
probability of any output. A dishonest player may, however, abort the protocol,
in which case the honest player gets the erasure symbol ∆ as output3. A weaker
definition, called weak coin flipping, only requires that each party cannot increase
the probability of their preferred value.
Without any additional assumptions, unconditionally secure weak coin flip-
ping (and therefore also strong coin flipping) cannot be implemented by a classi-
cal protocol. This follows from a result by Hofheinz, Mu¨ller-Quade and Unruh [9],
3 The dishonest player may abort after receiving the output bit, but before the
honest player gets the output bit. This allows cases where the honest player gets, for
example, 0 with probability 1/2 and ∆ otherwise. There exists also a definition of coin
flipping where a dishonest player does not have this unfair advantage, and the honest
player must always get a uniformly random bit, no matter what the other player does.
See [7,12,16].
which implies that if two honest players always receive the same uniform bit,
then there always exists one player that can force the bit to be his preferred
value with certainty.
If the players can communicate using a quantum channel, unconditionally
secure coin flipping is possible to some extent. The bounds of the possibilities
have been investigated by a long line of research. Aharanov et al. [1] presented
a strong coin flipping protocol where no quantum adversary can force the out-
come to a certain value with probability larger than 0.914. This bound has been
improved by Ambainis [2] and independently by Spekkens and Rudolph [18] to
0.75 (see also [8] for a different protocol). For weak coin flipping, Spekkens and
Rudolph [19] presented a protocol where the dishonest player cannot force the
outcome to its preferred value with probability larger than 1/
√
2 ≈ 0.707. (Inde-
pendently, Kerenidis and Nayak [10] showed a slightly weaker bound of 0.739.)
This bound has further been improved by Mochon, first to 0.692 [13] and finally
to 1/2 + ε for any constant ε > 0 [15], therefore getting arbitrarily close to the
theoretical optimum. For strong coin flipping, on the other hand, this is not
possible, since it has been shown by Kitaev [11] (see [3] for a proof) that for
any quantum protocol there is always a player able to force an outcome with
probability at least 1/
√
2. Chailloux and Kerenidis [6] showed that a bound of
1/
√
2 + ε for any constant ε > 0 can be achieved, by combining two classical
protocols with Mochon’s result: They first showed that an unbalanced weak coin
flip can be implemented using many instances of weak coin flips, and then that
one instance of an unbalanced weak coin flip suffices to implement a strong coin
flip with optimal achievable bias.
1.1 Limits of previous Results
In all previous work on quantum coin flipping, honest players are required to
output a perfect coin flip, i.e., the probability of both values has to be exactly 1/2,
and the players must never disagree on the output or abort. However, in practice
the players may very well be willing to allow a small probability of error even if
both of them are honest. Furthermore, a (quantum) physical implementation of
any protocol will always contain some noise and, therefore, also some probability
to disagree or abort. This requirement is, therefore, overly strict and raises the
question how much the cheating probability can be reduced when allowing an
error of the honest players.
It is well-known that there exist numerous cryptographic tasks where allowing
an (arbitrarily small) error can greatly improve the performance of the protocol.
For example, as shown in [4], the amount of secure AND gates (or, alternatively,
oblivious transfers) needed between two parties to test equality of two strings is
only O(log 1/ε) for any small error ε > 0, while it is exponential in the length
of the inputs in the perfect case. Considering reductions from oblivious transfer
to different variants of oblivious transfer where the players can use quantum
communication, it has recently been shown that introducing a small error can
reduce the amount of oblivious transfer needed by an arbitrarily large factor [20].
It can easily be seen that some improvement on the achievable parameters
must be possible also in the case of coin flipping: In any protocol, the honest
players can simply flip the output bit with some probability. This increases the
error, but decreases the bias. In the extreme case, the two players simply flip
two independent coins and output this value. This prohibits any bias from the
adversary, at the cost of making the players disagree with probability 1/2.
The only bounds on coin flipping we are aware of allowing for an error of the
honest players have been given in the classical setting. An impossibility result for
weak coin flipping has been given in [9]. Nguyen, Frison, Phan Huy and Massar
presented in [17] a slightly more general bound and a protocol that achieves the
bound in some cases.
1.2 Contribution
We introduce a general definition of coin flipping, characterized by 6 parameters,
which we denote by
CF(p00, p11, p0∗, p1∗, p∗0, p∗1) .
The value pii (where i ∈ {0, 1}) is the probability that two honest players output
i and the value p∗i (pi∗) is the maximal probability that the first (second) player
can force the honest player to output i. With probability 1 − p00 − p11, two
honest players will abort the protocol and output a dummy symbol.4 This new
definition has two main advantages:
– It generalizes both weak and strong coin flipping, but also allows for addi-
tional types of coin flips which are unbalanced or lay somewhere between
weak and strong.
– It allows two honest players to abort with some probability.
We will first consider classical protocols (Section 3), and give tight bounds for
all parameters. The impossibility result (Lemma 5) uses a similar proof technique
as Theorem 7 in [9]. In combination with two protocols showing that this bound
can be reached (Lemma 4), we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Let p00, p11, p0∗, p1∗, p∗0, p∗1 ∈ [0, 1]. There exists a classical pro-
tocol that implements an unconditionally secure CF(p00, p11, p0∗, p1∗, p∗0, p∗1) if
and only if
p00 ≤ p0∗p∗0 ,
p11 ≤ p1∗p∗1 , and
p00 + p11 ≤ p0∗p∗0 + p1∗p∗1 −max(0, p0∗ + p1∗ − 1)max(0, p∗0 + p∗1 − 1) .
4Similar to [9], we can require that two honest players always output the same
values, since the players can always add a final round to check if they have the same
value and output the dummy symbol if the values differ.
For weak coin flipping, i.e., p∗1 = 1 and p0∗ = 1, the bound of Theorem 1
simplifies to the condition that p00 ≤ p∗0, p11 ≤ p1∗, and
1− p00 − p11 ≥ (1− p∗0)(1 − p1∗) ,
which is the bound that is also implied by Theorem 7 in [9].
In Section 4, we consider the quantum case, and give tight bounds for all
parameters. The quantum protocol (Lemma 10) bases on one of the protocols
presented in [6], and is a classical protocol that uses an unbalanced quantum
weak coin flip as a resource. The impossibility result follows from the proof of
Kitaev’s bound on quantum strong coin flipping (Lemma 11).
Theorem 2. Let p00, p11, p0∗, p1∗, p∗0, p∗1 ∈ [0, 1]. For any ε > 0, there exists a
quantum protocol that implements an unconditionally secure CF(p00, p11, p0∗ +
ε, p1∗ + ε, p∗0 + ε, p∗1 + ε) if
p00 ≤ p0∗p∗0 ,
p11 ≤ p1∗p∗1 , and
p00 + p11 ≤ 1 .
If these bounds are not satisfied then there does not exist a quantum protocol for
ε = 0.
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Fig. 1. For values p0∗ = p∗0 = p1∗ = p∗1 = 3/4, this figure shows the achievable
values of p00 and p11 in the classical and the quantum setting. The light grey
area is the set of all coin flips that can be defined. (See Definition 1.)
Our results, therefore, give the exact trade-off between weak vs. strong coin
flipping, between bias vs. abort-probability, and between classical vs. quantum
coin flipping. (Some of these trade-offs are shown in Figures 1 and 2.) They
imply, in particular, that quantum protocols can achieve strictly better bounds
if p0∗ + p1∗ > 1 and p∗0 + p∗1 > 1. Outside this range classical protocols attain
the same bounds as quantum protocols.
Since the optimal quantum protocol is a classical protocol using quantum
weak coin flips as a resource, the possibility to do weak coin flipping, as shown
by Mochon [15], can be seen as the crucial difference between the classical and
the quantum case.
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
p∗
a
Defined
Previous Classical
Classical
Quantum
Fig. 2. This graph shows the optimal bounds for symmetric coin flipping of
the form CF((1 − a)/2, (1 − a)/2, p∗, p∗, p∗, p∗). The value p∗ is the maximal
probability that any player can force the coin to be a certain value, and a is the
abort probability. Therefore, the smaller p∗ for a fixed value of a, the better is the
protocol. The definition of coin flipping (Definition 1) implies that p∗ ≥ (1−a)/2.
Hence, the theoretically optimal bound is p∗ = (1− a)/2. In the quantum case,
the optimal achievable bound is p∗ =
√
(1 − a)/2. In the classical case the
optimal achievable bound is p∗ = 1 −
√
a/2 for a < 1/2 and the same as the
quantum bound for a ≥ 1/2. The best previously known classical lower bounds
from [9,17] was p∗ ≥ 1−
√
a.
2 Preliminaries
In a classical protocol, the two players (Alice and Bob) are restricted to classical
communication. Both players are given unlimited computing power and memory,
and are able to locally sample random variables from any distribution. In a
quantum protocol, the two players may exchange quantum messages. They have
unlimited quantum memory and can perform any quantum computation on it.
All operations are noiseless. At the beginning of the protocol, the players do not
share any randomness or entanglement. While honest players have to follow the
protocol, we do not make any assumption about the behaviour of the malicious
players. We assume that the adversary is static, i.e., any malicious player is
malicious from the beginning. Furthermore, we require that the protocol has a
finite number of rounds.
Definition 1. Let p00, p11, p0∗, p1∗, p∗0, p∗1 ∈ [0, 1], such that p00 + p11 ≤ 1,
p00 ≤ min{p0∗, p∗0} and p11 ≤ min{p1∗, p∗1} holds.5 A protocol implements a
CF(p00, p11, p0∗, p1∗, p∗0, p∗1), if the following conditions are satisfied:
– If both players are honest, then they output the same value i ∈ {0, 1} with
probability pii and ∆ with probability 1− p00 − p11.4
– For any dishonest Alice, the probability that Bob outputs 0 is at most p∗0,
and the probability that he outputs 1 is at most p∗1.
– For any dishonest Bob, the probability that Alice outputs 0 is at most p0∗,
and the probability that she outputs 1 is at most p1∗.
Definition 1 generalizes the notion of both weak and strong coin flips and
encompasses, in fact, the different definitions given in the literature.
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CF
(
1
2
,
1
2
, 1,
1
2
+ ε,
1
2
+ ε, 1
)
.
– The unbalanced weak coin flip WCF(z, ε) of [6] is a
CF (z, 1− z, 1, 1− z + ε, z + ε, 1) .
– The strong coin flip of [6] is a
CF
(
1
2
,
1
2
,
1√
2
+ ε,
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1√
2
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)
.
5The last two conditions are implied by the fact that a dishonest player can always
behave honestly. Hence, he can always bias the coin to i ∈ {0, 1} with probability pii.
Note that CF(p00, p11, p0∗, p1∗, p∗0, p∗1) can also be defined as an ideal func-
tionality that is equivalent to the above definition. Such a functionality would
look like this: If there is any corrupted player, then the functionality first asks
him to send a bit b ∈ {0, 1} that indicates which value he prefers. The func-
tionality then flips a coin c ∈ {0, 1, ∆}, where the probabilities depend on b and
on which player is corrupted. For example, if the first player is corrupted and
b = 0, then c = 0 will be chosen with probability p∗0, c = 1 with probability
min(p∗1, 1− p∗0) and ∆ otherwise. The functionality then sends c to the adver-
sary, and the adversary chooses whether he wants to abort the protocol or not.
If he does not abort, the honest player receives c (which might already be ∆),
and ∆ otherwise. If none of the players are corrupted, the functionality chooses
a value c ∈ {0, 1, ∆} which takes on i ∈ {0, 1} with probability pii and sends c
to the two players.
3 Classical Coin Flipping
3.1 Protocols
Protocol CoinFlip1:
Parameters: p0∗, p1∗, p∗0, p∗1 ∈ [0, 1], p0∗ + p1∗ ≤ 1.
1. Alice flips a three-valued coin a such that the probability that a = i is
pi∗ for i = {0, 1}, and a = ∆ otherwise. She sends a to Bob.
2. If a = ∆, Bob outputs b = ∆. If a 6= ∆, Bob flips a coin b such that
b = a with probability p∗a and b = ∆ otherwise. Bob sends b to Alice
and outputs b.
3. If b = a Alice outputs b, otherwise ∆.
Lemma 1. If either p0∗+ p1∗ ≤ 1 or p∗0 + p∗1 ≤ 1, then there exists a classical
coin-flipping protocol with p00 = p0∗p∗0 and p11 = p1∗p∗1.
Proof. If p0∗ + p1∗ ≤ 1, they use Protocol CoinFlip1. (If p∗0 + p∗1 ≤ 1, they
exchange the role of Alice and Bob.) By construction, a malicious Bob cannot
bias Alice’s output by more than pi∗, and a malicious Alice cannot bias Bob’s
output by more than p∗i. Honest players output the value 0 with probability
p0∗p∗0 and 1 with probability p1∗p∗1. ⊓⊔
Protocol CoinFlip2:
Parameters: p, x0, x1, y0, y1 ∈ [0, 1].
1. Alice flips a coin a ∈ {0, 1} such that a = 0 with probability p and sends
it to Bob.
2. Bob receives the coin a and flips a coin b ∈ {0, 1} such that the proba-
bility that b = a is xa. He sends b to Alice. If b = a he outputs b.
3. If b = a, then Alice outputs b. If a 6= b, then Alice flips a coin c, such
that with probability yb, c = b and else c = ∆. She sends c to Bob and
outputs it.
4. If c = b Bob outputs c, else ∆.
Lemma 2. If p0∗ + p1∗ > 1, p∗0 + p∗1 > 1, p00 ≤ p0∗p∗0, p11 ≤ p1∗p∗1, and
p00 + p11 = p0∗p∗0 + p1∗p∗1 − (p0∗ + p1∗ − 1)(p∗0 + p∗1 − 1) (1)
then there exists a classical protocol implementing CF(p00, p11, p0∗, p1∗, p∗0, p∗1).
Proof. We use Protocol CoinFlip2 and choose the parameters
xi := p∗i , y0 :=
p0∗ − p
1− p , y1 :=
p1∗ + p− 1
p
, p :=
p00 − p0∗ + p0∗p∗1
p∗0 + p∗1 − 1 .
Note that if p = 1 then y0 is undefined (and the same holds for y1 if p = 0),
but this does not cause any problem since in this case the parameter y0 is never
used in the protocol.
We now verify that these parameters are between 0 and 1. We have y0, y1 ∈
[0, 1], if p ∈ [1− p1∗, p0∗]. To see that p lies indeed in this interval, note that the
upper bound follows from
p =
p00 − p0∗ + p0∗p∗1
p∗0 + p∗1 − 1 ≤
p0∗p∗0 − p0∗ + p0∗p∗1
p∗0 + p∗1 − 1 =
p0∗(p∗0 + p∗1 − 1)
p∗0 + p∗1 − 1 = p0∗ .
For the lower bound, note that
1− p = p∗0 + p∗1 − 1
p∗0 + p∗1 − 1 −
p00 − p0∗ + p0∗p∗1
p∗0 + p∗1 − 1
=
p∗0 + p∗1 − 1− p00 + p0∗ − p0∗p∗1
p∗0 + p∗1 − 1
=
p1∗p∗0 − p1∗ + p11
p∗0 + p∗1 − 1 , (2)
where we have used that
p∗0 + p∗1 − 1− p00 + p0∗ − p0∗p∗1
(1)
= p∗0 + p∗1 − 1− (p0∗p∗0 + p1∗p∗1 − (p0∗ + p1∗ − 1)(p∗0 + p∗1 − 1)− p11)
+ p0∗ − p0∗p∗1
= p∗0 + p∗1 − 1− p0∗p∗0 − p1∗p∗1 + p0∗p∗0 + p0∗p∗1 − p0∗ + p1∗p∗0 + p1∗p∗1
− p1∗ − p∗0 − p∗1 + 1 + p11 + p0∗ − p0∗p∗1
= p1∗p∗0 − p1∗ + p11 .
Therefore
p = 1− p11 − p1∗ + p1∗p∗0
p∗0 + p∗1 − 1 ≥ 1−
p∗1p1∗ − p1∗ + p1∗p∗0
p∗0 + p∗1 − 1 = 1− p1∗ .
It follows that p, x0, x1, y0, y1 ∈ [0, 1].
If both players are honest, then the probability that they both output 0 is
px0 + (1− p)(1− x1)y0 = px0 + (1− p)(1− x1)p0∗ − p
1− p
= pp∗0 + (1− p∗1)(p0∗ − p)
= pp∗0 − p(1− p∗1) + p0∗(1− p∗1)
=
p00 − p0∗ + p0∗p∗1
p∗0 + p∗1 − 1 (p∗0 + p∗1 − 1) + p0∗(1− p∗1)
= p00 .
The probability that they both output 1 is
p(1− x0)y1 + (1− p)x1 = p(1− p∗0)p1∗ + p− 1
p
+ (1− p)p∗1
= (1− p∗0)(p1∗ + p− 1) + (1 − p)p∗1
= p1∗(1− p∗0)− (1− p)(1− p∗0) + (1− p)p∗1
= p1∗(1− p∗0) + (1− p)(p∗1 + p∗0 − 1)
(2)
= p1∗(1 − p∗0) + p1∗p∗0 − p1∗ + p11
p∗0 + p∗1 − 1 (p∗1 + p∗0 − 1)
= p11 .
If Alice is malicious, she can bias Bob to output value i either by sending i as
first message hoping that Bob does not change the value, which has probability
xi = p∗i; or by sending the value 1− i hoping that Bob changes the value, which
occurs with probability 1 − x1−i = 1 − p∗1−i ≤ p∗i. Hence, she succeeds with
probability p∗i.
Bob can bias Alice to output value i by sending b = i independently of what
Alice had sent as first message. For i = 0, Alice will accept this value with
probability
p+ (1 − p)y0 = p+ (1− p)p0∗ − p
1− p = p0∗
and for i = 1 with probability
1− p+ py1 = 1− p+ pp1∗ + p− 1
p
= p1∗ . (3)
⊓⊔
In order to show that all values with p00 + p11 below the bound given in (1)
can be reached, we will need additionally the following lemma.
Lemma 3. If there exists a protocol P that implements a coin flip
CF(p00, p11, p0∗, p1∗, p∗0, p∗1), then, for any p
′
00 ≤ p00 and p′11 ≤ p11, there exists
a protocol P ′ that implements a coin flip CF(p′00, p
′
11, p0∗, p1∗, p∗0, p∗1).
Proof. P ′ is defined as follows: The players execute protocol P . If the output is
i ∈ {0, 1}, then Alice changes to ∆ with probability 1− p′ii/pii. If Alice changes
to ∆, Bob also changes to ∆. Obviously, the cheating probabilities are still
bounded by p0∗, p1∗, p∗0, p∗1, which implies that that protocol P
′ implements a
CF(p′00, p
′
11, p0∗, p1∗, p∗0, p∗1). ⊓⊔
Combining Lemmas 1, 2 and 3, we obtain Lemma 4.
Lemma 4. Let p00, p11, p0∗, p1∗, p∗0, p∗1 ∈ [0, 1]. There exists a classical protocol
that implements CF(p00, p11, p0∗, p1∗, p∗0, p∗1) if
p00 ≤ p0∗p∗0 ,
p11 ≤ p1∗p∗1 , and
p00 + p11 ≤ p0∗p∗0 + p1∗p∗1 −max(0, p0∗ + p1∗ − 1)max(0, p∗0 + p∗1 − 1) .
Proof. If p0∗+p1∗ > 1 and p∗0+p∗1 > 1, then Lemmas 2 and 3 imply the bound.
Otherwise, i.e., if either p0∗ + p1∗ ≤ 1 or p∗0 + p∗1 ≤ 1, then max(0, p0∗ + p1∗ −
1)max(0, p∗0 + p∗1 − 1) = 0 and the bound is implied by Lemmas 1 and 3. ⊓⊔
3.2 Impossibilities
The following lemma shows that the bounds obtained in Lemma 4 are optimal.
The proof uses the same idea as the proof of Theorem 7 in [9].
Lemma 5. Let the parameters p00, p11, p0∗, p1∗, p∗0, p∗1 be ∈ [0, 1]. A coin flip
CF(p00, p11, p0∗, p1∗, p∗0, p∗1) can only be implemented by a classical protocol if
p00 ≤ p0∗p∗0 ,
p11 ≤ p1∗p∗1 , and
p00 + p11 ≤ p0∗p∗0 + p1∗p∗1 −max(0, p0∗ + p1∗ − 1)max(0, p∗0 + p∗1 − 1) .
Proof. We can assume that the output is a deterministic function of the tran-
script of the protocol. This can be enforced by adding an additional round at
the end of the protocol where the two players tell each other what they are going
to output. Since we do not require the protocol to be efficient, Lemma 7 in [9]
implies that we can also assume that the honest parties maintain no internal
state except for the list of previous messages.
For any partial transcript t of a protocol, we define pt0∗ as the maximum over
all transcripts starting with t, i.e., the maximum probability with which Bob can
force Alice to output 0, given the previous interaction has given t. In the same
way, we define pt1∗, p
t
∗0, p
t
∗1. We define p
t
00 and p
t
11 as the probabilities that the
output of the honest players will be 00 and 11, respectively, given the previous
interaction has given t. We will now do an induction over all transcripts, showing
that for all t, we have
pt00 ≤ pt0∗pt∗0 ,
pt11 ≤ pt1∗pt∗1 , and
pt00 + p
t
11 ≤ pt0∗pt∗0 + pt1∗pt∗1 −max(0, pt0∗ + pt1∗ − 1)max(0, pt∗0 + pt∗1 − 1) .
For complete transcripts t, each honest player will output either 0, 1 or ∆
with probability 1 and we always have pt0∗ + p
t
1∗ − 1 ≤ 0 and pt∗0 + pt∗1 − 1 ≤ 0.
Therefore, we only need to check that pt00 ≤ pt0∗pt∗0 and pt11 ≤ pt1∗pt∗1. For
j ∈ {0, 1}, if ptjj = 1, then ptj∗ = pt∗j = 1, so the condition is satisfied. In all the
other cases we have ptjj = 0, in which case the condition is satisfied as well.
Let t now be a partial transcript, and let Alice be the next to send a message.
Let M be the set of all possible transcripts after Alice has sent her message. For
the induction step, we now assume that the statement holds for all transcript in
M , and show that then it must also hold for t. Let ri be the probability that an
honest Alice will choose message i ∈M . By definition, we have
pt00 =
∑
i∈M
rip
i
00, p
t
11 =
∑
i∈M
rip
i
11, p
t
0∗ =
∑
i∈M
rip
i
0∗, p
t
1∗ =
∑
i∈M
rip
i
1∗ ,
pt
∗0 = max
i∈M
pi
∗0, p
t
∗1 = max
i∈M
pi
∗1 .
For j ∈ {0, 1} it holds that
ptjj =
∑
i∈M
rip
i
jj ≤
∑
i∈M
rip
i
j∗p
i
∗j ≤
∑
i∈M
rip
i
j∗p
t
∗j = p
t
j∗p
t
∗j ,
which shows the induction step for the first two inequalities. To show the last
inequality, let
f(a, b, c, d) := ac+ bd−max(0, a+ b− 1)max(0, c+ d− 1) ,
where a, b, c, d ∈ [0, 1]. If we fix the values c and d, we get the function fc,d(a, b) :=
f(a, b, c, d). It consists of two linear functions: If a+ b ≤ 1, we have
fc,d(a, b) = ac+ bd ,
and if a+ b ≥ 1 we have
fc,d(a, b) = ac+ bd− (a+ b− 1)max(0, c+ d− 1) .
Note that these two linear functions are equal if a+ b = 1, and we have (a+ b−
1)max(0, c+d− 1) ≥ 0 if a+ b ≥ 1. It follows that fc,d(a, b) is concave, meaning
that for all γ, a, b, a′, b′ ∈ [0, 1], we have
γfc,d(a, b) + (1− γ)fc,d(a′, b′) ≤ fc,d(γa+ (1− γ)a′, γb+ (1− γ)b′) . (4)
Since for any a+ b 6= 1 and c+ d 6= 1
∂
∂c
f(a, b, c, d) ≥ 0 and ∂
∂d
f(a, b, c, d) ≥ 0 , (5)
we have f(a, b, c′, d) ≥ f(a, b, c, d) for c′ ≥ c and f(a, b, c, d′) ≥ f(a, b, c, d) for
d′ ≥ d. Hence,
pt00 + p
t
11
=
∑
i∈M
ri(p
i
00 + p
i
11)
≤
∑
i∈M
ri
(
pi0∗p
i
∗0 + p
i
1∗p
i
∗1 −max(0, pi0∗ + pi1∗ − 1)max(0, pi∗0 + pi∗1 − 1)
)
≤
∑
i∈M
ri
(
pi0∗p
t
∗0 + p
i
1∗p
t
∗1 −max(0, pi0∗ + pi1∗ − 1)max(0, pt∗0 + pt∗1 − 1)
)
(4)
≤ pt0∗pt∗0 + pt1∗pt∗1 −max(0, pt0∗ + pt1∗ − 1)max(0, pt∗0 + pt∗1 − 1) ,
and the inequalities also hold for t. The statement follows by induction. ⊓⊔
From Lemmas 4 and 5 we obtain Theorem 1.
4 Quantum Coin Flipping
4.1 Protocols
An unbalanced weak coin flip with error ε WCF(z, ε) is a CF(z, 1 − z, 1, 1 −
z + ε, z + ε, 1), i.e., a coin flip where Alice wins with probability z, Bob with
probability 1 − z and both cannot increase their probability to win by more
than ε. (They may, however, decrease the probability to 0.) Let WCF(z) :=
WCF(z, 0).
It has been shown by Mochon [15] that weak coin flipping can be implemented
with an arbitrarily small error.
Theorem 3 (Mochon [15]). For any constant ε > 0, there exists a quantum
protocol that implements WCF(1/2, ε).
In [14], Mochon showed that quantum coin-flipping protocols compose se-
quentially. Implicitly using this result, Chailloux and Kerenidis showed that an
unbalanced weak coin flip can be implemented from many instances of (balanced)
weak coin flips.
Proposition 1 (Chailloux, Kerenidis [6]). For all z ∈ [0, 1], there exists a
classical protocol that uses k instances of WCF(1/2, ε) and implements WCF(x, 2ε),
for a value x ∈ [0, 1] with |x− z| ≤ 2−k.
The following lemma shows that the parameter z can be slightly changed
without increasing the error much.
Lemma 6. For any 1 > z′ > z > 0, there exists a classical protocol that uses 1
instance of WCF(z′, ε) and implements WCF(z, ε+ z′ − z).
Proof. The protocol first calls WCF(z′, ε). If Alice wins, i.e., if the output is 0,
then she changes the output bit to 1 with probability 1 − z/z′, and sends the
bit to Bob. Bob only accepts changes from 0 to 1, but not from 1 to 0. Alice
can force the coin to be 0 with probability at most z′ + ε = z + (ε + z′ − z).
Let x ∈ [0, 1 − z′ + ε] be the probability with which a cheating Bob forces the
protocol WCF(z′, ε) to output 1. Alice will output 1 with probability
x+ (1− x)
(
1− z
z′
)
= 1− z
z′
+ x · z
z′
≤ 1− z
z′
+ (1 − z′ + ε) · z
z′
= 1− z + ε · z
z′
≤ 1− z + ε .
⊓⊔
Note that for z ∈ {0, 1}, the implementation of WCF(z, 0) is trivial. Hence,
Theorem 3, Proposition 1 and Lemma 6 imply together that WCF(z, ε) can be
implemented for any z ∈ [0, 1] with an arbitrarily small error ε. To simplify the
analysis of our protocols, we will assume that we have access to WCF(z) for
any z ∈ [0, 1]. The following lemma shows that when WCF(z) is replaced by
WCF(z, ε), the bias of the output is increased by at most 2ε.
Lemma 7. Let P be a protocol that implements CF(p00, p11, p0∗, p1∗, p∗0, p∗1)
using one instance of WCF(z). If WCF(z) is replaced by WCF(z, ε), then P
implements CF(p00, p11, p0∗ + 2ε, p1∗ + 2ε, p∗0 + 2ε, p∗1 + 2ε).
Proof. Let us compare two settings: one where the players execute P using one
instance of WCF(z, ε), and the other where they use one instance of WCF(z).
When both players are honest, the two settings are obviously identical. Let Alice
be honest and Bob malicious. For each setting, we can define an event that occurs
with probability at most ε, such that under the condition that the two events do
not occur, WCF(z) and WCF(z, ε) and hence the whole protocol are identical.
The probability that the two events do not occur is at least 1− 2ε by the union
bound. Therefore, the probabilities that the honest player outputs 0 (or 1) differ
by at most 2ε. The statement follows. ⊓⊔
The following protocol is a generalization of the strong coin-flipping protocol
S from [6]. It gives optimal bounds for the case where the honest players never
abort, i.e., p00 + p11 = 1.
Protocol QCoinFlip1:
Parameters: x, z0, z1, p0, p1 ∈ [0, 1].
– Alice flips a coin a ∈ {0, 1} such that the probability that a = 0 is x
and sends a to Bob.
– Alice and Bob execute WCF(za).
– If Alice wins, i.e., the outcome is 0, then both output a.
– If Bob wins, then he flips a coin b such that b = a with probability pa.
Both output b.
Lemma 8. Let p0∗, p1∗, p∗0, p∗1 ∈ [0, 1] where p∗0 + p∗1 > 1, p0∗ + p1∗ > 1 and
p∗0p0∗+p∗1p1∗ = 1. Given access to one instance of WCF(z), we can implement
a CF(p00, p11, p0∗, p1∗, p∗0, p∗1) where p00 = p0∗p∗0 and p11 = p1∗p∗1.
Proof. We execute Protocol QCoinFlip1, choosing the parameters
pi := 1− p∗1−i , z0 := p∗0 + p∗1 − 1
p∗1
, z1 :=
p∗0 + p∗1 − 1
p∗0
,
and x :=
p0∗p∗0 + p∗1 − 1
p∗0 + p∗1 − 1 .
Note that
1− z0 = 1− p∗0
p∗1
and 1− z1 = 1− p∗1
p∗0
.
Since 1 − p∗0 < p∗1 and 1 − p∗1 < p∗0, these values are between 0 and 1, and
hence also z0 and z1 are between 0 and 1. From p0∗ ≤ 1 follows that x ≤ 1, and
from p∗0p0∗ + p∗1 ≥ p∗0p0∗ + p∗1p1∗ = 1 that x ≥ 0. Furthermore, we have
z0 + (1− z0)p0 = p∗0 + p∗1 − 1
p∗1
+
(1− p∗1)(1 − p∗0)
p∗1
= p∗0 (6)
and
z1 + (1− z1)p1 = p∗0 + p∗1 − 1
p∗0
+
(1− p∗1)(1− p∗0)
p∗0
= p∗1 .
Alice can bias Bob’s coin to 0 with probability
max{z0 + (1− z0)p0; (1− p1)} = p∗0
and to 1 with probability
max{z1 + (1− z1)p1; (1 − p0)} = p∗1 .
The probability that Bob can bias Alice’s coin to 0 is
x+ (1− x)(1− z1) = (1 − z1) + xz1
=
1− p∗1
p∗0
+
p0∗p∗0 + p∗1 − 1
p∗0 + p∗1 − 1 ·
p∗0 + p∗1 − 1
p∗0
= p0∗
and the probability that he can bias it to 1 is
(1− x) + x(1− z0) = 1− xz0
(6)
= 1− p0∗p∗0 + p∗1 − 1
p∗0 + p∗1 − 1 ·
p∗0 + p∗1 − 1
p∗1
= 1− p0∗p∗0 + p∗1 − 1
p∗1
=
1− p0∗p∗0
p∗1
=
p1∗p∗1
p∗1
= p1∗ .
Furthermore, two honest players output 0 with probability
xz0 + x(1 − z0)p0 + (1− x)(1 − z1)(1− p1)
= x(z0 + (1− z0)p0) + (1 − x)1− p∗1
p∗0
p∗0
= xp∗0 + (1− x)(1 − p∗1)
= 1− p∗1 + x(p∗0 + p∗1 − 1)
= p0∗p∗0
= p00
and 1 with probability 1− p00 = 1− p0∗p∗0 = p1∗p∗1 = p11. ⊓⊔
The following protocol gives optimal bounds for the general case. It uses one
instance of the above protocol, and lets Alice and Bob abort in some situations.
Protocol QCoinFlip2:
Parameters: Protocol P , ε0, ε1 ∈ [0, 12 ].
– Alice and Bob execute the coin-flipping protocol P .
– If Alice obtains 0, she changes to ∆ with probability ε0. If Bob obtains 1,
he changes to ∆ with probability ε1. If either Alice or Bob has changed
to ∆, they both output ∆, otherwise they output the value obtained
from P .
Lemma 9. Let p0∗, p1∗, p∗0, p∗1 ∈ [0, 1] where p∗0 + p∗1 > 1, p0∗ + p1∗ > 1
and p0∗p∗0 + p∗1p∗1 ≤ 1. Given access to WCF(z) for any z ∈ [0, 1], we can
implement a CF(p00, p11, p0∗, p1∗, p∗0, p∗1) where p00 = p0∗p∗0 and p11 = p1∗p∗1.
Proof. From p∗0 + p∗1 > 1 and p0∗+ p1∗ > 1 follows that either p∗0+ p1∗ > 1 or
p0∗ + p∗1 > 1. Without loss of generality, let us assume that p∗0 + p1∗ > 1.
Let
p′0∗ := min
(
1,
1− p1∗p∗1
p∗0
)
and p′
∗1 :=
1− p′0∗p∗0
p1∗
.
First, note that since p0∗ ≤ 1−p1∗p∗1p∗0 we have p′0∗ ≥ p0∗. Obviously, we also have
p′0∗ ≤ 1. Since p′0∗ ≤ 1−p1∗p∗1p∗0 , we have
p′
∗1 =
1− p′0∗p∗0
p1∗
≥
1− 1−p1∗p∗1
p∗0
p∗0
p1∗
=
p1∗p∗1
p1∗
= p∗1 .
In order to see that p′
∗1 ≤ 1, we need to distinguish two cases. Since p′0∗ :=
min
(
1, 1−p1∗p∗1
p∗0
)
, it holds that either p′0∗ = 1 or p
′
0∗ =
1−p1∗p∗1
p∗0
. In the first
case,
p′
∗1 =
1− p∗0
p1∗
<
p1∗
p1∗
= 1 ,
and the claim holds. In the second case,
p′
∗1 =
1− p′
∗0p∗0
p1∗
=
1− (1 − p1∗p∗1)
p1∗
= p∗1 ≤ 1 ,
and the claim also holds. Therefore, p′
∗1 ≤ 1.
Since p′0∗p∗0 + p1∗p
′
∗1 = 1, according to Lemma 8, we can use protocol
QCoinFlip1 to implement a CF(p′00, p
′
11, p
′
0∗, p1∗, p∗0, p
′
∗1), where p
′
00 = p
′
0∗p∗0
and p′11 = p1∗p
′
∗1. Using that protocol as protocol P , let Alice and Bob execute
protocol QCoinFlip2 with ε0 := 1− p0∗/p′0∗, and ε1 := 1− p∗1/p′∗1.
The probability that Bob can bias Alice to 0 is now (1 − ε0)p′0∗ = p0∗,
and the probability that Alice can bias Bob to 1 is now (1 − ε1)p′∗1 = p∗1.
Furthermore, the probability that two honest players output both 0 is (1 −
ε0)p
′
00 = (1− ε0)p′0∗p∗0 = p0∗p∗0 and the probability that they both output 1 is
(1− ε1)p′11 = (1 − ε1)p1∗p′∗1 = p1∗p∗1. ⊓⊔
Lemma 10. Let p00, p11, p0∗, p1∗, p∗0, p∗1 ∈ [0, 1] with
p00 ≤ p0∗p∗0 ,
p11 ≤ p1∗p∗1 , and
p00 + p11 ≤ 1 .
Then, for any constant ε > 0, there exists a quantum protocol that implements
CF(p00, p11, p0∗ + ε, p1∗ + ε, p∗0 + ε, p∗1 + ε).
Proof. Let us first assume that p∗0 + p∗1 > 1 and p0∗ + p1∗ > 1. We reduce
the value of p0∗ to p00/p∗0 and the value of p1∗ to p11/p∗1, which ensures that
p0∗p∗0 + p1∗p∗1 ≤ 1. Now we can apply Lemma 9, together with Theorem 3,
Proposition 1 and Lemmas 6, 7 and 3.
If the assumption does not hold then either p∗0 + p∗1 ≤ 1 or p0∗ + p1∗ ≤ 1.
In this case, we can apply Lemmas 1 and 3. ⊓⊔
4.2 Impossibilities
In order to see that the bound obtained in Section 4.1 is tight, we can use the
proof of Kitaev [11] (printed in [3]) showing that an adversary can always bias
the outcome of a strong quantum coin-flipping protocol. In fact, Equations (36)
- (38) in [3] imply that for any quantum coin-flipping protocol, it must hold that
p11 ≤ p1∗p∗1. In the same way, it can be proven that p00 ≤ p0∗p∗0. We obtain
the following lemma.
Lemma 11. A CF(p00, p11, p0∗, p1∗, p∗0, p∗1) can only be implemented by a quan-
tum protocol if
p00 ≤ p0∗p∗0 ,
p11 ≤ p1∗p∗1 , and
p00 + p11 ≤ 1 .
Lemma 10 and 11 imply together Theorem 2.
5 Conclusions
We have shown tight bounds for a general definition of coin flipping, which
give trade-offs between weak vs. strong coin flipping, between bias vs. abort
probability, and between classical vs. quantum protocols.
Our result extends the work of [6], and shows that the whole advantage
of the quantum setting lies in the ability to do weak coin flips (as shown by
Mochon [15]). If weak coin flips are available in the classical setting, classical
protocols can achieve the same bounds as quantum protocols.
For future work, it would be interesting to see if similar bounds hold for
the definition of coin flipping without the possibility for the malicious player to
abort.
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